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INTRODUCTION
While a bankrupt estate is already in a world of uncertainty, the
current jurisprudence surrounding rejection of intellectual property
executory contracts does anything but put those involved at ease. Part
of the reason for the uncertainty is the fundamentally different policy
goals of bankruptcy and intellectual property law.
While an efficient and effective bankruptcy proceeding provides
insolvent businesses with a way to preserve their business, the need to
protect intellectual property licenses has become increasingly
important in recent years. However, balancing these needs has created
tension.1 The ultimate goal in bankruptcy law is to “maximize the
* J.D. candidate, May 2013, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; Indiana University, Bachelor’s in Psychology, 2009.
1
Peter S. Menell, Bankruptcy Treatment of Intellectual Property Assets: An
Economic Analysis, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 733, 737 (2007).
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value of a failing or failed” entity’s remaining assets.2 By providing
trustees and debtors-in-possession the ability to reject contracts that
may be harmful to the failing entity, bankruptcy courts are able to
accomplish this goal.3
Intellectual property law aims to promote economic growth by
“encouraging a robust licensing market to exploit the value of
intellectual creativity.”4 This goal is best effectuated through freedom
of contract and strong enforcement of licensed property rights.5
Although Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code (“the Code”) gives
the trustee of a bankrupt intellectual property licensor a limited right to
reject unperformed, or executory, contracts,6 this right should not
eviscerate the licensee’s right to use the property.7 Rather, rejection is
a means to effectuate bankruptcy law’s policy goals while not giving a
windfall to the bankrupt.8 At first blush this may seem obvious,
however, courts have disagreed as to what it means to reject an
executory contract.9
In a recent Seventh Circuit decision, Sunbeam Products, Inc. v.
Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC, Chief Judge Easterbrook held
that the rejection of a trademark license did not entitle the trustee to
recapture the property.10 However, prior to Sunbeam, many courts had

2

Id.
Menell, supra note 1.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2006) (providing, in relevant part, “the trustee, subject to
the court's approval, may . . . reject any executory contract . . . of the debtor”).
7
See Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir.
2012) (holding that rejection does not rescind the contract).
8
See id. If, upon rejection, licensees were to lose their right to use the license
and left with a money damages claim, then it is likely the trustee will not suffer a
loss from rejecting the contract. As discussed in Part I, it is unlikely the licensee will
recover very much, if anything from a prepetition claim for damages.
9
Compare Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 377, with Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v.
Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th Cir. 1985).
10
Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 378.
3
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followed a Fourth Circuit decision, Lubrizol Enterprises v. Richmond
Metal Finishers.11
In 1985, the Fourth Circuit, in Lubrizol, prevented a licensee,
through the debtor’s right to reject an executory contract, from using a
technology the debtor had previously licensed.12 Displeased with this
result, Congress, in 1988, enacted Section 365(n) of the Code,13 which
gives intellectual property licensees the right to continue using the
intellectual property it bargained for, even if the representative of the
bankrupt estate rejects the contract.14 As defined by the Code,
“intellectual property” includes trade secrets, patents, and copyrights,
but does not include trademarks.15 While Congress apparently
11

756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985); E.g., In re Logical Software, Inc., 66 B.R.
683, 686 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986).
12
Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048.
13
S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3201 (1988).
14
11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1), which provides:
If the trustee rejects an executory contract under which the debtor is a
licensor of a right to intellectual property, the licensee under such
contract may elect-(A) to treat such contract as terminated by such rejection if such
rejection by the trustee amounts to such a breach as would entitle the
licensee to treat such contract as terminated by virtue of its own terms,
applicable nonbankruptcy law, or an agreement made by the licensee
with another entity; or
(B) to retain its rights (including a right to enforce any exclusivity
provision of such contract, but excluding any other right under
applicable nonbankruptcy law to specific performance of such
contract) under such contract and under any agreement supplementary
to such contract, to such intellectual property (including any
embodiment of such intellectual property to the extent protected by
applicable nonbankruptcy law), as such rights existed immediately
before the case commenced, for-(i) the duration of such contract; and
(ii) any period for which such contract may be extended by the
licensee as of right under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
15
Id. at § 101(35A), which provides:
The term “intellectual property” means-(A) trade secret;
(B) invention, process, design, or plant protected under title 35;
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intended to revisit the trademark issue, it never took action; leaving
unanswered questions about the appropriate protection courts should
afford trademark licensees.16
Some judges believe that Section 365(n) represents Congressional
recognition of the validity of the Lubrizol holding, with respect to
trademarks.17 Congress’ choice not to use Section 365(n) to protect
trademark licensees has led courts to infer, by negative inference, that
in the event a trademark license is rejected, Lubrizol is controlling.18
Therefore, as the argument goes, because Congress created Section
365(n) to ensure intellectual property licensees could retain their rights
after rejection, excluding trademarks suggests Congress was
comfortable with trademark licensees losing their rights upon
rejection.19
However, the legislative history suggests that Congress enacted
Section 365(n) as an exception to Lubrizol’s interpretation of
“rejection” under Section 365(g), and Congress chose to simply
exclude trademarks until more studies could be done.20 Creating a split
in the circuits, the Seventh Circuit held in Sunbeam that excluding
trademarks from Section 365(n) does not effect how courts should

(C) patent application;
(D) plant variety;
(E) work of authorship protected under title 17; or
(F) mask work protected under chapter 9 of title 17;
to the extent protected by applicable nonbankruptcy law.
16
S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3204 (1988).
17
Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC 686 F.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir.
2012). See also e.g., In re Chipwich, Inc., 54 B.R. 427, 431 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985);
In re Blackstone Potato Chip Co., Inc., 109 B.R. 557, 560 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990); In
re Centura Software Corp., 281 B.R. 660, 674 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002); In re HQ
Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 507, 513 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003); In re Old Carco
LLC, 406 B.R. 180, 211 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
18
In re Exide Techs., 607 F. 3d 957, 966 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J.,
concurring).
19
Id.
20
S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3202-03.
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treat them upon rejection21 and that rejection does not entitle trustees
to reclaim the licensed property.22
Part I of this Note discusses the underlying policies of bankruptcy
and trademark law. Part II reviews case law pertaining to intellectual
property license rejection rights. Part III analyzes the Sunbeam
decision and its effect on intellectual property license agreements in
bankruptcy. Part IV of this Note compares the Seventh Circuit’s view
of rejection with the Fourth Circuit’s view, and concludes that
Sunbeam properly analyzed Section 365(g). Finally this note suggests
that the Supreme Court should settle what it means to reject a
trademark license agreement.
I. BANKRUPTCY AND TRADEMARK LAW AND THE POLICIES THEY SERVE
A. Bankruptcy Law and Policy
When a corporation files for bankruptcy, the Code “creates an
estate,”23 which is a separate legal entity from the debtor (or bankrupt
corporation).24 In every Chapter 11 bankruptcy the trustee or the
debtor in possession owes a fiduciary duty to the bankrupt estate.25
Section 365(a) of the Code grants trustees the right, “subject to the
court’s approval,” to “assume or reject any executory contract . . . of
the debtor.” 26 Courts have “interpreted § 365 as requiring . . . a twostep inquiry to determine the propriety of rejection: first, whether the
contract is executory; next, if so, whether its rejection would be
advantageous to the bankrupt.”27
21

Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 375.
Id. at 377.
23
11 U.S.C. § 541 (2006).
24
Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding
"Rejection', 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845, 851 (1988).
25
Andrew, supra note 24, at 851-52.
26
11 U.S.C. § 365(a).
27
Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043,
1045 (4th Cir. 1985). See also NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 518
(1984) (where the Court first determined that a collective-bargaining agreement was
22
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While not explicitly defined in the Code, a contract may be
considered executory if both parties have not fully performed their
obligations.28 Many courts hold that an executory contract is one
“under which the obligations of both the bankrupt and the other party
to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to
complete the performance would constitute a material breach excusing
the performance of the other.”29
For example, a farmer may lease machinery to a neighboring
farmer. The lease may provide that the farmer agrees to loan the
machinery to the neighbor and to do all repairs on the machine in
exchange for a monthly rental fee. During the course of the lease, both
parties have unperformed obligations. A material breach would occur
if either party fails to perform its obligation, and thus, the contract is
executory.30
Next, to ensure rejection would be advantageous to the
bankrupt,31 courts generally apply some form of the business judgment
rule.32 Rooted in corporate law, “the business judgment rule is a
common-law standard of judicial review designed to protect the wide
latitude conferred on a board of directors in handling the affairs of the

an executory contract); In re Petur U.S.A. Instrument Co., Inc., 35 B.R. 561, 563
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983); In re Exide Techs., 607 F. 3d 957, 964 (3d Cir. 2010)
(holding that Exide could not reject an agreement because it was not an executory
contract).
28
In re Crippin, 877 F.2d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 1989).
29
Gloria Mfg. Corp. v. Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 734 F.2d 1020,
1022 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part
I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973)).
30
Id.
31
In re Logical Software, Inc., 66 B.R. 683, 686 (Bankr. D. Mass.1986)
(quoting Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043,
1045 (4th Cir. 1985)).
32
See Group of Inst. Investors v. Chi., M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 318 U.S. 523,
550 (1943). See also NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 526 (1984)
(holding that in the context of collective-bargaining agreements, a stricter standard
than “business judgment” should be applied); Andrew, supra note 24, at 895-96.
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corporate enterprise.”33 Directors who make informed business
decisions in good faith and who exercise due care are free “from
liability for honest errors or mistakes in judgment.”34 In bankruptcy,
courts generally accept a bankrupt’s request to reject an executory
contract “unless it is shown that the bankrupt’s decision was taken in
bad faith or in gross abuse of the bankrupt’s retained business
discretion.”35 When a debtor’s main asset is a right to license
intellectual property, courts generally approve rejection as a sound
business decision.36
Upon rejection, Section 365(g) of the Code treats the estate as if it
breached the contract prior to petition.37 As a result, the “nondebtor
contracting party has a prepetition general unsecured claim for breach
of contract damages, one not entitled to administrative priority.”38
A prepetition claim is simply a “right to payment”39 by a
creditor.40 These creditors receive, on a pro rata basis, what ever is left
33

William M. Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations, 3A
FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 1036 (2012).
34
Miller v. Thomas, 656 N.E.2d 89, 95 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). See also Fletcher,
supra note 33.
35
Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1047.
36
E.g., id.
37
11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2006); Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 530; 8B C.J.S.
Bankruptcy § 915 (2012).
38
8B C.J.S. Bankruptcy § 915. See also 11 U.S.C. § 365(g).
39
11 U.S.C. § 101(5), which states in full:
The term “claim” means—
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or
unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such
breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an
equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.
40
Id. at § 101(10)(A), which provides, “the term ‘creditor’ means [an] entity
that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for
relief concerning the debtor.”

42
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in the estate after postpetition administrative expenses have been
paid.41 Postpetition administrative expenses include, among other
things, “the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the
estate.”42 Since postpetition administrative expenses receive priority
over prepetition claims, and oftentimes must be paid in full, creditors
filing prepetition claims rarely recover the full amount.43
However, the implications of this “breach” are not entirely clear.44
While the Code states that rejection “constitutes a breach” of a
contract,45 courts have interpreted rejection as anything from a
“release”46 “of contract obligations”47 to something tantamount to
rescission.48 These starkly differing interpretations can have
significant consequences.49

41

Laura B. Bartell, Straddle Obligations Under Prepetition Contracts:
Prepetition Claims, Postpetition Claims or Administrative Expenses?, 25 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 39, 39 (2008).
42
11 U.S.C. § 503(b).
43
Bartell, supra note 41.
44
See Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 378 (7th
Cir. 2012).
45
11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (which provides “the rejection of an executory contract
or unexpired lease of the debtor constitutes a breach of such contract or lease”).
46
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984).
47
Andrew, supra note 24, at 847.
48
See Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043,
1048 (4th Cir. 1985) (where rejection ultimately allowed the debtor to reclaim
technology it had previously licensed the use of).
49
Compare Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 377 (holding that rejection merely frees the
licensor from any further contract obligations, but does not entitle the rejecting party
to reclaim the property), with Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048 (holding that rejection
entitles the rejecting party to recapture the use of the licensed property).

43
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B. Trademark Law and Policy
A trademark is a form of intellectual property that represents the
user’s brand name.50 Trademarks can take the form of a “word, name,
symbol, device, or any combination, used or intended to be used to
identify and distinguish the goods/services of one seller or provider
from those of others, and to indicate the source of the
goods/services.”51 Trademarks serve a dual purpose: “to protect both
consumers from deception and confusion over trade symbols and to
protect the plaintiff's infringed trademark as property.”52
Unlike a patent or copyright, a trademark is not property in the
traditional sense.53 A trademark symbolizes the goodwill of an existing
business, and for that reason has no independent property value.54
While a patent can be licensed for the sole use of the patent,55 a
trademark flows with the business it is associated with.56
A trademark’s value is based in part on the value of the underlying
business’ goodwill.57 Therefore, trademarks encourage companies to
produce high quality goods and services and to “invest in building the
‘goodwill’ surrounding a brand name.”58 While this function of
trademarks promotes innovation, it is the distinctiveness, not the
inventiveness, which determines whether a trademark is protected.59

50

What is a trademark or servicemark?, UNITED STATES PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/index.jsp (last updated Oct.
24, 2012).
51
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 50.
52
J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, 1
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:2 (4th ed.) (2012).
53
See Hanover Star Milling Co., v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916). See
also McCarthy, supra note 52, at § 2:15.
54
Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 265 (5th Cir. 1999).
55
Mennell, supra note 1, at 741.
56
Id. at 750.
57
Hanover, 240 U.S. at 412.
58
Mennell, supra note 1, at 741.
59
Id.

44
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Unless a trademark license is an executory contract, it may not be
rejected.60 As discussed above, an executory contract requires that
both parties have material, unperformed obligations.61 A typical
trademark license is executory because the “licensor has continuing
quality control obligations and the licensee typically has payment,
reporting, marketing, and other continuing performance obligations.”62
For example, in In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., the agreement at
issue required the franchisee to maintain operational standards in at
least one HQ center and to pay a monthly royalty to the debtors.63 In
addition, the debtor had granted the franchisee exclusive use of HQ
trademarks in certain territories.64 Therefore, the debtor had a
continued obligation to refrain from using the trademark in the
franchisee’s territories.65 The court held that taken together, the
agreement was an executory contract because at the time the
bankruptcy petition was filed, both parties had unperformed material
obligations.66
C. Conflict
Before Congress enacted Section 365(n), intellectual property
licensees, assuming Lubrizol was correctly decided, were at the mercy
of their bankrupt licensor.67 Under Lubrizol, a debtor could use its
rejection power to reclaim licensed intellectual property “in an effort
to negotiate better terms.”68 If a debtor can simply rescind an
60

See In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957, 964 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that
because the agreement did “not contain at least one ongoing material obligation” for
the licensee, it was not an executory contract, and thus, Exide could not reject it).
61
McCarthy, supra note 52, at § 18:30.
62
Mennell, supra note 1, at 764.
63
In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 507, 510 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
See Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043,
1048 (4th Cir. 1985).
68
Menell, supra note 1, at 768 (assuming Lubrizol was correctly decided).

45
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unfavorable license agreement, businesses that rely on licensing could
be put out of business.69
While this interpretation of rejection has serious consequences
once rejection has been approved, it equally affects bargaining power
at the negotiation stage. Young companies, for example, licensing their
intellectual property are at a bargaining disadvantage because there
will always be the concern that the young company may enter
bankruptcy and the licensee will lose its right to the intellectual
property.
Congress, and even the Lubrizol court, agreed that this “would
have a chilling effect on the development and licensing of intellectual
property.”70 As a result, Congress enacted Section 365(n) to protect
intellectual property licensees.71 However, Congress excluded
trademarks from Section 365(n), leaving it up to the courts to
determine whether trademarks should somehow be protected.72
II. RELEVANT CASE LAW
A. Pre-Section 365(n)
Before the enactment of Section 365(n) of the Code, the Fourth
Circuit in, Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers,
Inc., broadly construed a debtor’s power to reject an executory
contract.73 The court held that rejection relinquished the licensee’s

69

See id. at 768-9.
Patrick Law, Intellectual Property Licenses and Bankruptcy – Has the
IPLBA Thawed the “Chilling Effects” of Lubrizol v. Richmond Metal Finishers?, 99
COM. L.J. 261, 261 (1994).
71
S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3204 (1988).
72
Id. (Congress invites bankruptcy courts to use their equitable powers to
provide, if any, protection to trademark licensees).
73
See Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 377
(7th Cir. 2012) (where the court notes “[s]cholars uniformly criticize, Lubrizol” for
“confus[ing] rejection with the use of an avoiding power”).
70

46
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rights under the agreement, leaving the licensee with only a money
damages claim.74
This is a peculiar decision in light of how we typically think of
contract breaches. If a car dealership agrees to provide the lessee with
free auto service, but later breaches this agreement by refusing to offer
this service, the dealership cannot force the lessee to return the car.
Breach generally does not repudiate the contract, but rather, courts will
award lessees money damages for the difference in acquiring auto
services elsewhere.75
In Lubrizol, Richmond Metal Finishers (“RMF”) developed a
valuable metal coating process.76 RMF arranged to sell the technology
to Lubrizol in exchange for a percentage of the sales realized as a
result of the technology.77 The agreement was non-exclusive and RMF
agreed to defend Lubrizol in any claims of infringement.78
RMF filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and in doing so, intended to
reject the Lubrizol technology agreement.79 In spite of the bankruptcy
court’s approval of RMF’s motion for rejection,80 the district court
reversed.81 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy
court’s decision allowing RMF to reject the Lubrizol agreement.82

74

See Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043,
1048 (4th Cir. 1985).
75
24 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 64:2 (4th ed.). See also Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 377.
76
In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 38 B.R. 341, 342 (E.D. Va. 1984)
rev'd sub nom. Lubrizol, 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985).
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1045 (RMF hoped that rejecting the Lubrizol contract
would allow it to capitalize on the proprietary metal coating technology.).
80
Id. (The bankruptcy court concluded that the Lubrizol contract was
executory and rejection would “be advantageous to the bankrupt.”).
81
Id. at 1046 (The district court reversed on the grounds that the Lubrizol
contract was not executory and that rejection did not represent sound business
judgment.).
82
Id. at 1048.

47
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In order to reject the Lubrizol agreement, RMF had to show that
the agreement was an executory contract, and that “rejection would be
advantageous to the bankrupt.”83 The court held that the licensing
agreement was an executory contract because, among other duties and
obligations, Lubrizol had a duty to pay RMF royalties for the use of
the process, while RMF had the continuing obligation to notify
Lubrizol if it further licensed the technology.84
The next issue was whether rejection would benefit RMF.85
RMF’s metal coating process was its most valuable asset.86 Requiring
RMF to meet its continued obligations with Lubrizol would hinder its
ability to further license or sell this process.87 Without considering the
adverse effect upon Lubrizol, the court found it was within RMF’s
sound business judgment to reject the license agreement.88
While the court recognized that “rejection in this and comparable
cases could have a general chilling effect upon the willingness of such
parties to contract at all with businesses in possible financial
difficulty,” the court nonetheless held rejection was proper.89 The court
refused to indulge these equitable considerations because Congress
clearly allowed debtors to reject executory contacts, except for two
explicit exceptions: “union members under collective bargaining
contracts . . . and to lessees of real property.”90
Without offering significant analysis, the court cursorily
concluded that by rejecting an executory contract, the trustee had a
right to regain control of the licensed property.91 According to the
83

Id. at 1045.
Id.
85
Id. at 1046.
86
Id. at 1047.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 1048. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (2006). NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465
U.S. 513, 519.
91
Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048. See also Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago Am.
Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Lubrizol itself devoted scant
attention to the question [sic] whether rejection cancels a contract”).
84

48

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2012

13

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 3

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 8, Issue 1

Fall 2012

court, Section 365(g) merely allows the non-bankrupt party to recover
money damages.92 Furthermore, it found that Lubrizol could not
continue using the technology despite provisions in the RMF
agreement.93
In the three years between the Lubrizol decision and the
enactment of Section 365(n), other cases similarly held that rejection
prevented the non-debtor from using the licensed property.94 For
example, in In re Petur U.S.A. Instrument Co., the bankruptcy court
held that the bankrupt estate could not reject an executory contract
because the potential harm to the non-debtor was disproportionately
high compared to the benefit to the bankrupt estate.95 The court
reasoned that rejection would put the non-debtor out of business,
suggesting rejection would prevent the non-debtor from any further
use of the license.96
However, In re Select-A-Seat Corp., decided before the enactment
of Section 365(n), held that rejection only applies to the executory part
of the contract, and the licensee may continue using the property.97
The court stated that “rejection can cancel covenants requiring future
performances by the debtor,” but the license “cannot be summarily
terminated.”98 These cases highlight the varied opinions that courts
maintain regarding what it means to reject an executory contract.

92

Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (“[T]he rejection of an
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor constitutes a breach of such
contract or lease.”).
93
Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048.
94
In re Petur U.S.A. Instrument Co., Inc., 35 B.R. 561, 563 (Bankr. W.D.
Wash. 1983). See also e.g., In re Chipwich, Inc., 54 B.R. 427, 431 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1985) (holding that “by rejecting the two licenses the debtor will deprive [the
licensee] of its right to use the ‘Chipwich’ trademark for its products”).
95
In re Petur U.S.A. Instrument Co., Inc., 35 B.R. at 563-64.
96
Id. at 563.
97
625 F.2d 290, 292 (9th Cir. 1980).
98
Id. at 293.
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B. Enactment of Section 365(n)
Concerned with the impact Lubrizol would have on intellectual
property licenses, Congress enacted Section 365(n) in 1988 to prevent
“licensors from rejecting executory contracts.”99 As a remedial
protection for licensees, Congress intended Section 365(n) to clarify
that intellectual property licenses cannot be unilaterally terminated by
the rejection of a license.100
Section 365(n) provides licensees with two options in the event of
rejection.101 First, the licensee may treat rejection as a breach of
contract and seek damages as a creditor.102 Alternatively, the licensee
may retain the rights it had under the agreement before the licensor
filed for bankruptcy.”103 With respect to intellectual property other
than trademarks, allowing the licensee to continue using the
intellectual property imposes no additional burdens on the trustee,
while at the same time, avoids the chilling effect Congress feared.104
However, the same cannot be said for trademarks.
Trademarks require parties on both sides of the license to perform
to some extent.105 If Section 365(n) included trademarks, a licensee’s
ability to retain its rights under the agreement could put substantial
burdens on the bankrupt estate. Since trademark licenses “depend to a
large extent on control of the quality of the products or services sold
by the licensee,” Congress excluded trademarks from the definition of
intellectual property as it pertains to Section 365(n) until more studies
99

Law, supra note 70.
S. REP. NO., 100-505 at 3200 (1988).
101
Law, supra note 70, at 266.
102
See 11 U.S.C. § 365. Law, supra note 70, at 266 (which notes that this
option was available before Congress enacted § 365(n)). Under Lubrizol, this would
mean the licensee loses its right to use the intellectual property. Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at
1048.
103
Law, supra note 70, at 266.
104
Id.
105
Menell, supra note 1, at 750 (For example, “any licenses of trademarks-whether exclusive or nonexclusive--must be supervised by the trademark owner in
order to avoid abandoning the mark.”).
100
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could be done.106 Although Congress clearly intended to revisit this
matter, it has not yet done so.107
III. SUNBEAM DECISION
In Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago Am. Mfg., LLC, the
Seventh Circuit analyzed the effect of rejecting a trademark license
agreement.108 In addition, the court addressed the broader issue of
rejection as it applies to all intellectual property.109 The Seventh
Circuit took this as an opportunity to determine whether Lubrizol
properly interpreted the effect of rejection under Section 365(g).110
A. The Facts
Lakewood Engineering & Manufacturing Co. manufactured and
sold, among other products, box fans.111 In 2008, while already losing
money, Lakewood contracted its manufacturing out to Chicago
American Manufacturing (“CAM”).112 Lakewood authorized CAM to
make box fans using Lakewood’s patents and allowed it to adhere
Lakewood’s trademark to the fans.113 In addition, the contract gave
CAM the right to sell the remaining 2009 inventory if Lakewood was
unable to purchase the fans.114

106

S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3204 (1988).
Id.
108
686 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2012) (The district court certified a direct appeal
under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A) by Sunbeam Products, doing business as Jarden
Consumer Solutions. Id. at 374.).
109
Id.
110
Id. at 376.
111
In re Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Co., Inc., 459 B.R. 306, 310 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 2011) aff’d sub nom. Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372
(7th Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 790 (U.S. 2012).
112
Id. at 313.
113
Id.
114
Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 376.
107
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The following year, and merely months into the contract,
Lakewood’s creditors filed an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy
petition against it.115 In an effort to liquidate Lakewood, Sunbeam
Products bought Lakewood’s assets, which included its intellectual
property.116 The court appointed trustee rejected the CAM executory
contract, but CAM continued to make and sell the Lakewood fans.117
As a result, Sunbeam filed an adversary action against CAM,
claiming it did not have any right to use Lakewood’s patents and
trademarks.118 The bankruptcy court upheld the contract on equitable
grounds.119 The bankruptcy court reasoned that since CAM had
already manufactured a significant number of fans with the Lakewood
trademark, it was only fair to allow them to sell their inventory.120
B. Decision
While not reversing the bankruptcy judge’s ruling, the Seventh
Circuit found the ruling untenable because it couched the decision in
equity.121 The Seventh Circuit wrote that judges should not rule
contrary to the Code merely because they believe enforcing the Code
would be inequitable.122 Equity takes on different meanings, in
different situations, for different judges. While some may think equity
favors licensees by allowing them to rely on the strength of the

115

In re Lakewood, 459 B.R. at 320.
Id. at 325.
117
Id. at 327-28.
118
Id. at 328.
119
Id. at 345 (By couching its decision in equity, the bankruptcy judge did not
need to determine whether trademarks may be rejected under §§ 365(a) and (n)).
120
See id. at 343-47.
121
Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 376. In reference to the recent Supreme Court
decision, RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, Chief Judge
Easterbrook stated, “arguments based on views about the purposes behind the Code,
and wise public policy, cannot be used to supersede the Code’s provisions.” Id.
122
Id. at 375.
116
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license, others find equity to favor the creditors, because terminating
IP licenses allows the debtor to recover more of its claim.123
However, according to Sunbeam, it only matters what the Code
says, not where equity lies.124 By applying “well established principles
of statutory construction,”125 Sunbeam concluded that Section 365(g)
should not be read so expansively that rejection eviscerates the
licensee’s right to use the intellectual property.126
i. Trademarks
Chief Judge Easterbrook held that CAM may continue using the
Lakewood trademarks, despite Lakewood’s rejection of the licensing
agreement.127 The court reasoned that, although Congress excluded
trademarks from its definition of intellectual property,128 it did not
intend to approve of the principles held in Lubrizol.129 In fact,
Congress intended for Section 365(n) to act as a way for intellectual
property licensees to retain possession and use of licenses, despite
Lubrizol suggesting a licensor could reclaim the property.130
While Section 365(n) protects intellectual property licensees, as it
is defined in the Code, it is Sunbeam’s interpretation of Section 365(g)
that protects trademark licensees.131 However, Section 365(g) only
protects trademarks because Section 365(n) leaves trademarks

123

Id. at 375-76.
Id. at 376. Chief Judge Easterbrook goes on to quote RadLAX, “The
Bankruptcy Code standardizes an expansive (and sometimes unruly) area of law, and
it is our obligation to interpret the Code clearly and predictably using well
established principles of statutory construction.” RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v.
Amalgamated Bank,132 S.Ct. 2065, 2073 (2012).
125
RadLAX, 132 S.Ct. at 2073.
126
Sunbeam, 686 F.3d. at 376-78.
127
Id. at 378.
128
11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) (2006).
129
Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 375. See S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3200 (1988).
130
See S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3200.
131
See generally Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 377.
124
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unaffected.132 This principle is supported by Judge Ambro’s
concurring opinion in In re Exide Technologies, where he stipulated
“that [section] 365(n) neither codifies nor disapproves Lubrizol as
applied to trademarks.”133
Although the crux of the Exide opinion was whether “a perpetual,
exclusive, royalty-free license to use the Exide trademark in the
industrial battery business” was an executory contract, Judge Ambro,
in his concurring opinion, shed light on how to handle trademarks with
regard to Section 365(n).134 “For years, it was held that, while [Section
365(n)] covered licenses of most types of intellectual property, by
negative implication, it did not cover trademark licenses.”135
Therefore, according to these courts, Lubrizol’s holding would control,
and could prevent trademark licensees from using the trademark after
rejection.136 However, Judge Ambro concluded that courts should use
Section 365, coupled with “their equitable powers,” to further the
132

Id. at 375. Chief Judge Easterbrook provided that “[s]ome bankruptcy
judges have inferred from the omission [of trademarks from Section 365(n)] that
Congress codified Lubrizol with respect to trademarks, but an omission is just an
omission.” Id.
133
Id. (citing In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957, 966-967 (3d Cir. 2010)
(Ambro, J., concurring)).
134
In re Exide, 607 F.3d at 961, 965 (The court held that Exide could not reject
the license because it was not an executory contract.).
135
J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, 1
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:30 (4th ed.) (2012)
(citing In re Centura Software Corp., 281 B.R. 660, 669-670 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
2002) (“Consistent with the statutory language, 365(n)'s legislative history also
explicitly states that ‘the bill does not address the rejection of executory trademark,
trade name or service mark licenses.’”)). See also In re Dynamic Tooling Systems,
Inc., 349 B.R. 847, 856 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006) (“Hantover's license to use DTS's
trademarks and service marks is not protected by § 365(n) at all because trademarks
are not ‘intellectual property’ as that term is defined in the Code, § 101(35A)”); In re
Old Carco LLC, 406 B.R. 180, 211 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 2009) (“Trademarks are not
‘intellectual property’ … [and therefore] rejection of licenses by [a] licensor deprives
[the] licensee of [the] right to use [a] trademark but [the] licensee has [an] allowable
claim for damages for breach of contract”) (internal citation omitted); In re Exide,
607 F.3d at 966 (Ambro, J., concurring).
136
In re Exide, 607 F.3d at 966 (Ambro, J., concurring).
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bankrupt licensor’s goal of maximizing its assets, while not “let[ting] a
licensor take back trademark rights it bargained away.”137
ii. Effect of Rejection
Section 365(g) treats a rejected executory contract as a breach of
that contract.138 Therefore, if a trustee rejects an executory contract
under section 365(a), the non-debtor has the same rights as if the
trustee merely breached the contract outside of bankruptcy.139 In other
words, the non-debtor may recover damages for the breach. Therefore,
because Lakewood’s rejection of the CAM license agreement “did not
abrogate CAM’s contractual rights,” the Seventh Circuit held that
CAM may continue using the Lakewood trademarks.140
The Sunbeam decision has created a circuit split, yet after all
active judges had an opportunity to review the opinion, none favored a
hearing en banc.141 This could mean that all the other judges agreed
with the Sunbeam decision or that they did not think the issue was
significant enough to hear en banc.142

137

Id. at 967.
11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2006).
139
Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 376-77 (7th
Cir. 2012).
140
Id. at 378.
141
Id.
142
7th Cr. R. 40(e) (Any proposed opinion that creates a circuit split must be
circulated among all active judges and only after a majority of the judges vote
against a hearing en banc can the opinion be published.).
138
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C. Sunbeam’s Effect on Bankruptcy Law
i. Sunbeam Redefines Section 365(g) and the Implications of
Rejecting an Executory Contract
The Seventh Circuit is the first court of appeals to directly
repudiate the Lubrizol decision.143 The decision provides a second
interpretation of Section 365(g) and the implications of rejecting an
executory contract.144 Trademark licensees will cite Sunbeam for the
proposition that, despite rejection, Section 365(g) does not rescind the
contract, but rather the licensee may retain its rights to the intellectual
property.145
In addition, Sunbeam may have some applicability to other forms
of intellectual property not included in the Code’s definition.146
Sunbeam was not concerned with the underlying form of intellectual
property, except to the extent that it was excluded from Section
365(n).147 Because the form of intellectual property was not a
determinative factor, there is no reason a licensee of a trade name,
service mark, or foreign intellectual property should not invoke
Sunbeam in support of continued use after rejection.148 Had Sunbeam
narrowed its holding to only trademarks, then its interpretation of
143

Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 376 (“No other court of appeals has agreed with
Lubrizol – or for that matter disagreed with it. Exide, the only other appellate case in
which the subject came up, was resolved on the ground that the contract was not
executory and therefore could not be rejected.”).
144
Compare id. at 377, with Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal
Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1047 (4th Cir. 1985).
145
Sunbeam, 686 F.3d. at 378. However, while the licensee may continue
using the trademark, the unfilled obligations of the representative of the bankrupt’s
estate are converted into damages. Further, “nothing in this process implies that any
rights of the [non-rejecting party] have been vaporized.” Id. at 377.
146
Marc Fineman & Jonathan Friedland, Seventh Circuit: Bankruptcy Code’s
Definition of ‘Intellectual Property’ Does Not Include Trademarks, 29 THE BANKR.
STRATEGIST, Oct. 2012, at 1, 5.
147
See Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 375. (which after confirming that Section 365(n)
excludes trademarks, makes no mention of trademarks in its analysis).
148
Fineman, supra note 146, at 5.
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rejection under 365(g) may not apply to these other forms of
intellectual property.
ii. While Trademark Licensees Can Do Without Section 365(n), Other
Intellectual Property Licensees Cannot Forget About It
Following the Sunbeam decision, Section 365(n), to some extent,
is meaningless in the Seventh Circuit for trademark licenses. This
section leaves trademarks unaffected because “an omission is just an
omission.”149 Unable to invoke Section 365(n) for protection,
trademark licensees must rely on Sunbeam’s interpretation of Section
365(g). While this benefits trademark licensees, patent and copyright
licensees must continue to adhere to the terms of Section 365(n).150
Licensees that fall under Section 365(n) may retain the rights
gained under the agreement, but not without paying for it.151 For
example, licensees must continue making royalty payments and waive
“any right of setoff it may have with respect to such contract under
this title or applicable nonbankruptcy law.”152 Therefore, it would be
incorrect to claim that Sunbeam makes Section 365(n) wholly
insignificant.
One can see why, depending on the nature of the intellectual
property, this decision upsets certain licensees. Licensees subject to
Section 365(n) in its current form will likely balk at the decision
because while trademark licensees can retain the rights granted in the
license, other intellectual property licensees must pay for the same
retention. Expect licensees covered by Section 365(n) fight for
reliance on Section 365(g), and therefore hope not to be subject to the
costs associated with retaining rights under Section 365(n).

149

Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 375.
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2006).
151
See id. at § 365(n)(2).
152
Id.
150
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IV. COMPETING VIEWS
Now that there is a clear circuit split, it is only a matter of time
before the Supreme Court reviews what happens to the non-debtor’s
property after a representative of the bankrupt estate rejects an
executory contract or unexpired lease. On one hand, Lubrizol from the
Fourth Circuit held that with subsequent rejection, the non-debtor
party is stripped of the property and left with only a money damages
claim for breach of contract.153 On the other hand, the recently decided
Seventh Circuit case, Sunbeam, held that rejection does not give the
bankrupt party the right to recapture the asset.154
A. Rejection as an Avoiding Power
The Seventh Circuit found that Lubrizol missed the mark when it
equated rejection with an avoiding power. 155 While the Code entitles
trustees to rescind certain contracts through the use of various
avoiding powers,156 rejection under Section 365 is not one of them.157
“Avoiding-power rejection” is most often applied to the termination of
real property leases and technology licenses.158 While Congress has
since made clear that rejecting a real property lease “has no avoidingpower effect,”159 a brief explanation may help explain Lubrizol’s
reasoning.
Section 365(h) of the Code “provides that despite the rejection of
a real property lease in a lessor’s bankruptcy, the lessee may remain in
153

Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043,
1048 (4th Cir. 1985).
154
Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 377.
155
Id. See Andrew, supra note 24, at 916.
156
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 545, 547-48 & 553 (2006).
157
Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 377 (“[R]ejection is not ‘the functional equivalent of
a rescission, rendering void the contract and requiring that the parties be put back in
the positions they occupied before the contract was formed.’” (quoting Thompkins v.
Lil’ Joe Records, Inc., 476 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir. 2007))).
158
Andrew, supra note 24, at 902.
159
Id.
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possession for the term of the lease and any enforceable renewals,
continuing to pay rent but offsetting any damages caused by
nonperformance of the lessor’s covenants under the lease.”160 Like
Section 365(n), this provision allows the non-debtor to retain
possession of the property.161
Lubrizol alludes to the possibility that by enacting Section 365(h)
Congress contemplated rejection as having an avoiding power
effect.162 Had Congress envisioned rejection as simply freeing the
debtor from any further obligations, while allowing the non-debtor to
remain in possession of the property, could it not have stated so?
Instead, Congress enacted exemptions as problems arose.163 Therefore,
Lubrizol could be defended on the grounds that Congress interpreted
rejection as providing something similar to an avoiding power; and
additionally, because Section 365(n) had not been enacted, it was
160

Id. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(A), which provides:
If the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real property under which
the debtor is the lessor and-(i) if the rejection by the trustee amounts to such a breach as would
entitle the lessee to treat such lease as terminated by virtue of its
terms, applicable nonbankruptcy law, or any agreement made by the
lessee, then the lessee under such lease may treat such lease as
terminated by the rejection; or
(ii) if the term of such lease has commenced, the lessee may retain
its rights under such lease (including rights such as those relating to
the amount and timing of payment of rent and other amounts payable
by the lessee and any right of use, possession, quiet enjoyment,
subletting, assignment, or hypothecation) that are in or appurtenant to
the real property for the balance of the term of such lease and for any
renewal or extension of such rights to the extent that such rights are
enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
161
Andrew, supra note 24, at 902-03. S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3203 (1988)
(“The bill provides for treatment of intellectual property licenses under Section 365
in a manner that parallels generally the treatment of real estate leases in the existing
provision of Section 365(h)(1).”).
162
Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043,
1048 (4th Cir. 1985).
163
See S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3204 (1988), which states, “the bill is intended
to respond to a particular problem arising out of recent court decisions under Section
365.”
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proper to prevent the licensee from further use of the technology
license.
Many lower courts did not challenge this holding, and thus have
prevented trademark licensees from using the license after rejection.164
For example, in In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc. the court held that a
franchisee loses its right to use the trademark upon rejection.165 The
court reasoned that because Congress excluded trademarks from
Section 365(n), Lubrizol controls, and upon rejection, the franchisee
may no longer use the trademark.166
In addition, the court in In re Centura Software Corp. held that
rejection amounted to rescission because numerous authorities,
including cases before and after Congress enacted Section 365(n),
recognized Lubrizol as the dominating authority with regard to
trademark license rejection.167
Jurisdictions that follow Lubrizol would allow representatives of a
bankrupt estate to reject unprofitable trademark license agreements
and to shop around for something better. Worse yet, rejection could be
used as a negotiating sword.168 Licensees relying on the use of the
license will be forced to renegotiate their agreement, lest they may
otherwise lose the right to use the trademark. While Section 365(n)
addresses the chilling effect that a Lubrizol-like decision creates with
regard to copyrights and patents, trademarks are left in the cold.
Ostensibly, trademark licensees will fight tooth and nail to avoid an
interpretation of Section 365(g) that follows Lubrizol.

164

See e.g., In re Chipwich, Inc., 54 B.R. 427, 431 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); In
re Blackstone Potato Chip Co., Inc., 109 B.R. 557, 562 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990); In re
Centura Software Corp., 281 B.R. 660, 674 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002); In re HQ
Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 507, 513 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003); In re Old Carco
LLC, 406 B.R. 180, 211 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
165
In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 507, 513 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
166
Id.
167
In re Centura, 281 B.R. at 673.
168
In re Exide Techs., 607 F. 3d 957, 967 (3d Cir. 2010) (Judge Ambro,
concurring).
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B. Sunbeam
The Seventh Circuit took a wholly different view in Sunbeam. In
Sunbeam, Chief Judge Easterbrook stated that rejection did not entitle
the trustee or debtor to reclaim the licensed property.169 In Sunbeam,
the court reasoned that just as breach outside of bankruptcy does not
prevent a licensee from using the bargained for intellectual property,170
breach within bankruptcy does not entitle the rejecting party to rescind
the license agreement.171
While some courts have followed the Lubrizol interpretation,
others have held that rejection does not extinguish the underlying
obligation.172 In In re Continental Airlines, pilots for Continental
Airlines brought a claim for furlough pay after Continental filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy and rejected its collective bargaining
agreement.173 The Fifth Circuit held that because Section 365(g)
specifically uses the term “breach,” rejection “does not invalidate the
contract, or treat the contract as if it does not exist.”174 One cannot
breach a contract that does not exist.175 Therefore, if, upon rejection,
Continental could treat the collective bargaining agreement as if it did
not exist, then the pilots would not have a claim for damages, which is
clearly provided pursuant to Section 502(g) of the Code.176
169

Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir.

2012).
170

Id. at 376.
Id. at 377.
172
Although not interpreting Section 365(g) in the same context as Lubrizol
and Sunbeam, courts have interpreted Section 365(g) in other contexts. See, e.g., In
re Austin Dev. Co., 19 F.3d 1077, 1082 (5th Cir. 1994); O’Neil v. Cont’l Airlines,
Inc. (In re Cont’l Airlines), 981 F.2d 1450, 1459 (5th Cir. 1993); Kopolow v. P.M.
Holding Corp. (In re Modern Textile, Inc.), 900 F.2d 1184, 1191 (8th Cir. 1990);
Leasing Serv. Corp. v. First Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 826 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1987).
173
In re Cont’l Airlines, 981 F.2d at 1451.
174
Id. at 1459-60.
175
Id.
176
11 U.S.C. § 502(g)(1) (2006) which provides:
171
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Furthermore, in In re Modern Textile, Inc., the Eighth Circuit held
that rejection of an unexpired lease did not release the debtor of its
legal obligation, but rather functioned “as a breach of an existing and
continuing legal obligation of the debtor.”177
While trademark licensees are obviously happy about the
Sunbeam decision, licensees currently protected under Section 365(n)
may be upset. Under Sunbeam, trademark licensees have an unfair
advantage. By interpreting Section 365(g) as Sunbeam did, trademark
licensees will receive the same protections that other intellectual
property licensees currently receive under 365(n). Yet unlike other
intellectual property licensees, trademark licensees do not need to
comply with the terms of Section 365(n) in order to continue using the
license.178 Intellectual property licensees may view this outcome as a
windfall for trademark licensees. While the Supreme Court will likely
review what it means to reject an executory contract, treating
trademarks differently from other intellectual property may prompt
Congress to revisit Section 365(n).
CONCLUSION
Courts have struggled with the idea of rejecting executory
contracts since the turn of the century.179 While it is understood that
rejecting amounts to a “breach,” exactly what it means to breach an
executory contract is not always clear.180 Over the years Congress has
A claim arising from the rejection, under section 365 of this title or under
a plan under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of this title, of an executory contract
or unexpired lease of the debtor that has not been assumed shall be
determined, and shall be allowed under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this
section or disallowed under subsection (d) or (e) of this section, the same
as if such claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the petition.
In re Cont’l Airlines, 981 F.2d at 1459-60 (citing Sanders v. City of Brady
(In re Brady, Tex. Mun. Gas Corp.), 936 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir. 1991).
177
In re Modern Textile, Inc., 900 F.2d at 1191.
178
Section 365(n) requires licensees who decide to continue using the license
despite rejection to continue paying royalties and to waive setoffs.
179
Andrew, supra note 24, at 866.
180
Id. at 870.
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attempted to clarify rejection, beginning with real property lessees.181
After Lubrizol, Congress enacted Section 365(n) to protect intellectual
property licensees from interpretations of Section 365(g) that, like
Lubrizol, strip licenses from intellectual property licensees.182
However, despite Section 365(n), trademark licensees were still at
risk because trademarks were excluded from the provision.183 Then
came Sunbeam. The Seventh Circuit used Sunbeam to provide a
different interpretation of Section 365(g).184 Chief Judge Easterbrook
properly rejected the Lubrizol interpretation, and instead held that
rejection does not permit the rejecting party to recapture the licensed
property.185 Under Sunbeam, Section 365(n) is not necessarily needed
because the case held that rejection does not prevent the licensee from
using the license.
Licensors should be aware of how their circuit interprets Section
365 when deciding whether to reject an executory contract, and even
when negotiating a new license agreement. Licensees must also
understand how courts interpret rejection in their circuits because if
courts follow Lubrizol, they may have additional bargaining power, if
the licensor is either a new company, or one in financial straits.
Because the Supreme Court denied Sunbeam’s writ of certiorari to
review the Seventh Circuit’s decision,186 it remains to be seen whether
Congress will now step in to clarify rejection, include trademarks in
Section 365(n), or do nothing at all.
If Congress chooses to take no action, it will only lead to further
confusion among the circuits. Ostensibly, other circuits will address
this issue in the future and will need to decide for themselves what it
means to reject an executory contract. While the Seventh Circuit and

181

Id. at 867.
S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3202-03 (1988).
183
Id. at 3204.
184
See generally Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372
(7th Cir. 2012).
185
Id. at 377.
186
Order Denying Mot. Writ of Cert. Dec. 10, 2012.
182
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scholars have criticized Lubrizol,187 it is still technically good law in
the Fourth Circuit. Circuits that have not yet addressed this issue may
interpret rejection in any manner they choose.
Without any guidance from the Supreme Court, this issue will
only be further muddled in the years to come. If other circuits choose
not to follow Sunbeam’s reasoning, and instead base their decision on
equity, then businesses looking to enter licensing agreements cannot
be certain of how a court will interpret a possible rejection.
Furthermore, this lack of consistency among the courts will lead
to inefficient negotiations and, ultimately, license agreements. The
possibility that the licensor may reject the agreement should be
considered when negotiating license agreements. A licensee should be
compensated for taking the risk of rejection if a court in that
jurisdiction requires the licensee to give up the trademark. However, if
a court rules that rejection does not prevent the licensee from using the
trademark, then the licensee received a benefit that it did not bargain
for or necessarily deserve. Without a consistent interpretation of
rejection, contracting parties are unable to efficiently negotiate an
agreement that benefits both sides.
Despite the Supreme Court’s denial of Sunbeam’s writ of
certiorari, it is important that the Supreme Court review what it means
for a licensor to reject a trademark license. Perhaps in the near future
the Supreme Court will settle this rejection business once and for all.

187

Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 377-78; Andrew, supra note 24, at 916-19; Jay
Lawrence Westbrook, The Commission’s Recommendations Concerning the
Treatment of Bankruptcy Contracts, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 463, 470-72 (1997).
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